Islamophobic Backlash

Following the questions posed by Lila Abu-Lughod in Do Muslim Women Need Saving? (2002), several works have shed light on the issues surrounding the stereotype of the Arab Muslim woman who must be saved from the clutches of men around her. In the French context, this stereotype is placed in service of the triumphalist narrative of republican values and their emancipatory virtues, from a nationalist perspective, as demonstrated by the works of Mayanthi Fernando (2013) and Sara Farris (2021). Nacira Guénif’s pioneering work has been particularly significant in tracing the roots of this trope back to colonial ideologies, where the representation of Muslim women as oppressed served to justify French colonial interventions, framing the republic as a liberating force. In Les féministes et le garçon arabe (2004), co-written with Eric Macé, Guénif critically examines how Muslim women and men are both racialized and gendered within the French national narrative, with the assumption that Muslim women must be “saved” from their culture. Her work is crucial in highlighting how the figure of the oppressed Muslim woman is instrumentalized to reaffirm France’s civilizational mission and reinforces a dichotomy between Western “freedom” and Eastern “oppression.” France is indeed distinguished from other European countries by the power of the colonial imaginary surrounding the figure of the oppressed Muslim woman, to the point of representing a veritable literary genre (Hajjat 2021).

However, a major shift in the characterization of Muslim women can be seen in contemporary political discourse on the dangers of Islam for Europe. The notion of Islamophobic backlash refers to the violent reaction against the perceived empowerment of upwardly mobile Muslim women. The way Muslim women are considered has shifted from an emancipatory ambition to a more suspicious attitude towards their newly acknowledged agency. In this characterization of women, who are seen as capable of being as politically motivated as men, forms of backlash can indeed be recognized (Fuladi 1993). This term refers to the conservative reaction to the progression of struggles for equal rights and conditions. In this case, the backlash against upwardly mobile Muslim women is primarily aimed at undermining their feminist claims and unmasking their “Islamist” intentions. For example, in response to the growing number of voices claiming the veil as a personal or even feminist choice, this religious practice undergoes a shift in public discourse – from a clear sign of inferiority specific to a marginalized population to a sign of defiance of the norms established in French society. Muslim women claiming to be feminists are accused of emptying the feminist cause of its real meaning, favoring a strategy of victimization focused on women in order to gain political efficacy.

This backlash marks a shift in the way veiled women are treated: they are no longer seen as victims of Muslim men but as militants working, through the veil, to undermine and islamize Europe. They are no longer perceived as children or young girls but rather as mothers, educators, and active women. They are granted agency, but this is perceived as a threat to European values. The theme of university entryism – where women of immigrant backgrounds have greater access than their parents (Beauchemin et al. 2016) – illustrates and exacerbates this vision of Muslim women as fundamentally political beings. They are no longer confined to the affective, familial, or neighborhood sphere, but are viewed as genuine political actors.

For example, during the hearings of a parliamentary commission in France on the means of combating Islamic radicalization, a recurring theme was the role of Muslim women, described as using the infantilizing gaze cast upon them to push forward the norms of French society toward Islamic standards. Several interviewees expressed indignation at the innocence willingly accorded to women in radicalization prevention schemes. They denounced an “offense of naivety or a denial of reality” and called for an end to the perception of Muslim women as ingénues to be saved, considering them just as involved in the “neo-Islamist” conspiracy as men (Delattre and Eustache-Brinio 2020:34).

The backlash also features a reversal: the visible social ascent of Muslim women and their political battles are condemned as signs of their subordination to the political project of “Islamist” men. Women are considered to be “used” and “sent” by Islamists in a rhetoric of consensual exploitation of women. This particular representation of women’s agency views them as acting of their own free will, in adherence to a project that is not their own, but which they willingly support. While women are the actors of their demands, the Muslim men – “they” – constitute the grammatical subject of the enunciation (ibid.:73).

Faced with a supposed Islamist project described as inescapable and supported by women, the goal is no longer to emancipate women but to prevent them from propagating new social norms. The 2022 “long-skirt affair” in France is a clear demonstration of this paradigm shift. At a time of growing controversy over the clothing worn by young high-school girls to circumvent the ban on religious symbols in schools, these women are no longer seen as victims of radical recruitment but as militants in an Islamist and separatist conspiracy, signaling a fundamental repoliticization of the way Muslim women are viewed, along with their activities and intentions. They are seen as determinedly pursuing a political goal over which they have complete control, marking a major break from the figure of the vulnerable, fragile Muslim woman enrolled against her will in a logic that goes beyond her.